The relation
What is meant is that heritage, for Shahrur, is not a problem merely because it is old. The problem begins when it shifts from a historical experience open to study into an epistemic authority that binds the reader to a prior understanding, or into a political authority that justifies obedience and coercion in the name of religion.
In this way, criticism of heritage moves from the level of interpretive tools to the level of power: reasons for revelation, abrogation, analogy, and consensus may close the text epistemically, and the conflation of religion and power may turn this closure into political despotism.
Why does it matter?
This relation brings together two paths that often appeared separate: criticism of jurisprudence as historical knowledge, and criticism of authoritarianism as a monopoly over religion and law. Its value lies in showing that the problem is not the existence of heritage, but elevating it to a status equal to the text or giving political power a sacred cover.
Close evidence
- Criticism of heritage, jurisprudence, and interpretation
- Criticism of the tools of interpretive and jurisprudential heritage
- Heritage jurisprudence is not suitable for contemporary legislation
- Salafi reading makes the understanding of the early generations an absolute reference
- Jurisprudence is a human historical heritage that does not possess authority equal to the Qur’an
- The historical conflation of religion and power produced despotism and extremism
Its effect in the atlas
This relation links the principles of jurisprudence and criticism of heritage jurisprudence with the state and religion and with criticism of authoritarianism and monism. It prevents reading criticism of heritage as merely an epistemic issue, or criticism of power as merely a political issue.