What Is Meant Here
What is meant here is the consensus relied upon by jurists in matters of fighting. Shahrur objects to treating it as binding evidence, since it is more historical and sectarian than universal.
This entry belongs to the Shahrur Glossary.
What Is Attributed to Shahrur
Shahrur says that the consensus relied upon by jurists in matters of fighting is not binding evidence; he describes it as more historical and sectarian than universal. The objection established in this passage thus concerns the probative force of this consensus, not the mere existence of a historical juristic agreement.
The Atlas’s Explanation
Describing consensus as “historical and sectarian” indicates a limitation of its authority in the case at hand: the evidence does not present it as a universally binding ruling. This evidence alone does not establish that every human agreement is rejected, or that every use of the concept of consensus receives the same judgment.
For connected reading, see also: traditional jurisprudence, prohibition, and Principles of Jurisprudence and the Critique of Traditional Jurisprudence.
A Qualified Conclusion
In synthesis, it may be said that Shahrur’s critique, in this evidence, rejects treating a specific juristic consensus in matters of fighting as binding evidence because it is “more historical and sectarian than universal.” This conclusion is qualified by the wording of the evidence and its stated context; it is not a rule documented here for all chapters of jurisprudence.
An Open Question and the Limits of Reading
The available source does not clarify the alternative mechanism Shahrur proposes for determining rulings in matters of fighting, nor does it explain his detailed position on contemporary consultation or social agreement. Nor does it establish a comprehensive definition of consensus across all usages in legal theory; therefore, this critique should not be generalized beyond its documented scope.