This entry belongs to the Shahrur lexicon. Consensus appears in Shahrur’s critique as an example of turning a historical understanding or human agreement into a binding authority that exceeds its proper limits.
Meaning in Shahrur’s view
Consensus is not an absolute proof for Shahrur. Its value, if any, is historical and ijtihad-based, and it may not close the text or prevent reconsideration in light of new knowledge and a new reality. For this reason, his critique of consensus is linked to his critique of inherited jurisprudence and to his critique of the authority that grants the past final immunity.
Its function in the critique
- Distinguishes between a historical human agreement and revelation.
- Rejects turning a prior agreement into an authority that prevents later ijtihad.
- Links the critique of consensus to the critique of inherited jurisprudence when jurisprudence becomes a higher standard than the text.
- Opens the way to a civil law and contemporary ijtihad that neither nullifies the text nor repeats the past.
Foundational links
- Consensus is not an absolute proof
- Consensus is not an absolute proof
- Inherited jurisprudence
- Prohibition
- Principles of jurisprudence and the critique of inherited jurisprudence
Limits of the reading
The critique of consensus does not mean rejecting consultation or social agreement. What is meant is that historical agreement does not become revelation, and it does not prevent society from exercising ijtihad within its new epistemic and legal boundaries.