What Is Attributed to Shahrur
Shahrur says: “This is where we enter the concept of shura in Islam (democracy).” He then defines it as “the practice of freedom by a group of people within an epistemic, ethical, aesthetic, and customary frame of reference.” He makes freedom of expression of opinion one of “the foremost foundations of shura,” along with the presence of “opinion and the other opinion” and “equality in freedom of expression among differing opinions.”
The other supporting text states: “Shura is the Qur’anic term for democracy; it is the practice of freedom within a frame of reference, and acceptance of pluralism is its sound foundation.”
Atlas Explanation
What is meant here is broader than consultation as a limited procedure: shura, under this definition, requires a sphere in which people can express divergent opinions on an equal footing. The frame of reference mentioned is not an unspecified general term; the text names epistemic, ethical, aesthetic, and customary frames of reference.
Shahrur adds that shura is practiced within a social, economic, and political structure, that it “takes successive historical forms,” and that it is subject to historical development. Thus, in this account, it is not to be read apart from the conditions of the society in which it is practiced.
For connected reading: Muhammad Shahrur, State and Society, Shura, Freedom, Pluralism, The Civil State, Religion, and Authority.
Synthetic Inference
Taken together, freedom of expression, opinion and the other opinion, and equality among opinions indicate that pluralism functions as a condition of practice, rather than merely describing a socially diverse reality. But this is an inference from the structure of the definition, not an institutional detail provided by the witness itself.
This atom is connected to the question of representing plurality in the public sphere: The people and the state translate plurality within a political unity.
Open Question and Limits of the Evidence
The available text does not specify how these foundations are translated into institutions: does it set out a mechanism for election, representation, or voting, and what happens when the frames of reference it lists conflict? Nor is the association of shura with “democracy” sufficient to ascribe to it all the characteristics of modern democratic systems; what is established here is Shahrur’s definition and his general conditions for its practice.